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Abstract. Das Adam Smith Problem is name given by eighteenth century German scholars 
to the question of how to reconcile the role of self-interest in the Wealth of Nations with 
Smith’s advocacy of sympathy in Theory of Moral Sentiments. As the discipline of 
economics developed, it focused on the interaction of selfish agents, pursuing their private 
interests. However, behavioural economists have rediscovered the existence and 
importance of multiple motivations and a new Das Adam Smith Problem has arisen, of 
how to accommodate self-regarding and pro-social motivations in a single system. This 
question is particularly important because of evidence of motivation crowding, where 
paying people can backfire, with payments achieving the opposite effects from those 
intended. Psychologists have proposed a mechanism for the crowding out of “intrinsic 
motivations” for doing a task, when payment is used to incentivise effort. However, they 
argue that pro-social motivations are different from these intrinsic motivations, implying 
that crowding out of pro-social motivations requires a different mechanism. In this paper I 
present an answer to the new Das Adam Smith problem, proposing a mechanism that can 
underpin the crowding out of both pro-social and intrinsic motivations, whereby 
motivations are prompted by frames and motivation crowding is underpinned by the 
crowding out of frames. I explore some of the implications of this mechanism for research 
and policy. 
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1. The new Das Adam Smith Problem: There and back again 
 Das Adam Smith Problem is the name given by eighteenth century German 
scholars to the question of how to reconcile the role of self-interest in The Wealth of Nations 
with Smith’s advocacy of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It seemed to them 
that Adam Smith had written two very different books. Their (now disputed) reading was 
that The Wealth of Nations is founded on an egoistic theory of behaviour, showing how the 
interaction of self-interested individuals could lead to benefits for all. In contrast, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments not only espouses a theory of human nature in which we have 
multiple motivations, especially “sympathy”, which can underpin moral judgments and 
virtuous actions, but Smith argues that we ought not to be purely self-interested: “And 
hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, 
and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and 
can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which 
consists their whole grace and propriety” (Smith, 1759, Part I, Ch. 1). In the twenty-first 
century, few scholars believe there is a contradiction between the two books; however, 
there is no consensus about the right way to solve Das Adam Smith Problem (see Montes, 
2003 for a survey of the current debate). 
 Regardless of the status of Das Adam Smith Problem, the point remains that in 
eighteenth-century it was standard to acknowledge that multiple motivations are 
relevant for the study of political economy. But this picture was on the wane. The lure 
of Smith’s idea that an agent who intends only his own gain is led by an “invisible 
hand” to pursue the good of society, “more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it” (Smith, 1776, Book IV, Ch.2) proved compelling for many. By the nineteenth 
century, James Stewart Mill wrote of political economy that, ”It is concerned with [man] 
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the 
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.” (Mill, 1836/ 1874, essay 5, 
paragraphs 38 and 48). Nevertheless, political economists did not offer the pursuit of 
wealth as a complete theory of human nature. Mill wrote that the desire for wealth was 
not the whole of Man’s nature; that there are other human motives, such as “the 
affections, the conscience, or feeling of duty, and the love of approbation”. However, he 
considered these to be the subject matter of philosophy. This prefigures the turn of 
economics towards treating people as solely pursuing their own private and selfish 
material interests, which I will call the principle of self-regard. 
 The principle of self-regard became increasingly important in the late 19th 
century, as economics replaced political economy as the subject that studies production, 
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exchange, and the distribution of resources. Economists such as Alfred Marshall and 
Francis Edgeworth emphasized the way in which the interaction of individual agents 
causes economic outcomes. They pioneered a theory of behaviour in which individuals 
maximise utility and firms maximise profits, subject to constraints on their budgets and 
resources. This is the core of neo-classical economics, the current mainstream of the 
subject. Strictly speaking, “utility” is an empty placeholder which includes anything 
that might make an agent choose one option over another. However, in practice it is 
usually taken to be a function of the agent’s own consumption of goods and services.  A 
standard graduate textbook in microeconomic theory states that, “A defining feature of 
microeconomic theory is that it aims to model economic activity as an interaction of 
individual economic agents pursuing their private interests” (Mas-Colell, Whinston and 
Green, 1995, p.3). This approach arguably has its roots in The Wealth of Nations; it 
discards Smith’s insights about other sources of motivation in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.  
 However, in the twenty-first century, economics is seeing a renaissance of some 
of the traditional themes of political economy. It has rediscovered the existence and 
importance of pro-social motivations, both for the design of institutions and in market 
settings. Economists have studied altruism, fairness, equity, kindness, reciprocity, and 
trustworthiness, to name a few. These are studied alongside the principle of self-regard, 
which is still acknowledged as an important driver of behaviour in many 
circumstances. Therefore we have a renewed Das Adam Smith Problem for the twenty-
first century: how do we integrate the fact that much economic analysis is based on self-
regard (via the price mechanism) with renewed interest in and evidence of the 
importance of pro-social motivations? This acuteness of this problem is demonstrated 
by evidence that paying people can backfire if they are driven by pro-social 
motivations. A synthesis would provide directions and instructions for the designers of 
institutions. Which motivations people use—and should use—in a given context has 
implications for how to structure institutions and incentives. 
 In order to set up the problem (and to introduce some of the distinctions that will 
play a part in later discussion), in Section 2 I present a taxonomy of motivations from 
psychology and relate it to evidence from behavioural economics. In Section 3, I explain 
why the problem is of more than theoretical interest. There is a large literature, which 
originated in psychology, that shows that paying people can have perverse effects on 
their behaviour, the so-called motivation crowding effect. The original demonstrations 
of motivation crowding involved payments for effort, but economists have tended to 
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assume that motivation crowding also applies to pro-social behaviour. However, 
psychologists have argued that pro-social behaviour is relevantly different from 
payment for effort, in a way that means their standard theoretical explanation does not 
apply, leaving a question about the mechanism behind the crowding out of pro-social 
motivations. In Section 4, I propose a mechanism, drawing on framing, that can explain 
why payments affect both effort and pro-social motivations.  In Section 5, I explore its 
implications for research and institutional design. 
 
2. Evidence for pro-social behaviour and pro-social motivations 
 The principle of self-regard makes mistakes about the ends that people pursue 
and the reasons for which they pursue them: they may be concerned with ends other 
than their own outcomes, and their reasons for pursuing them need not be completely 
self-interested.  In contrast to the assumption of the principle of self-regard, people’s 
behaviour may be pro-social, promoting the well-being of others. (Note that this can 
include promoting the well-being of specific others, which may not promote the well-
being or interests of society as a whole. For example, a mafioso can act pro-socially 
towards other members of the cosa nostra, but that can lead to bad outcomes for 
society.) There is a vast amount of evidence, from behavioural economics as well as 
psychology, that people are not only concerned with their own outcomes. Participants 
in experiments give money in dictator games and return money in one-shot trust 
games. Psychologists have also studied helping behaviour in a more contextualized 
manner, putting subjects in actual helping situations, which they do not realise are an 
experimental set-up. 
 Pro-social behaviour promotes the wellbeing of others. Pro-social motivation is a 
motivation to promote the wellbeing of others. Motivation is a slippery concept, it 
means different things to different writers. For instance, in psychology a motivation 
could be a goal-directed force (Batson, 1994), while in philosophy a motivation might be 
shorthand for a motivating reason (Parfit, 1984). For the purposes of this paper, either of 
these two ways of casting motivation would do and they could be used 
interchangeably. Indeed, one psychologist describes motivations in a manner that 
combines these two ideas, as “the reasons that drive actions” (Grant, 2008, p.48). 
 There can be chains of motivations. If we ask of any individual’s behaviour 
“Why did she do that?” we can often take the answer and run at least one more 
iteration of the question. For instance, if someone gives to a food bank then we can ask 
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of our donor “Why did she give food?” Our answer might be “Because she was 
concerned with the welfare of people who cannot afford to feed themselves.” But then 
we can ask the further question “Why was she concerned with the welfare of people 
who cannot afford to feed themselves?”. One possible answer is “Because she takes 
pleasure in others’ welfare gains”; another possibility is that there is no further answer, 
improving people’s welfare is her ultimate motivation or her ultimate goal. Some 
motivations or goals may be seen as instrumental, pursued for the sake of a higher 
motivation or goal. The ultimate motivation or goal is the place where the buck stops. 
 As well as debates about the possibility of pro-social behaviour and proximate 
pro-social motivations and goals, there is also debate about the nature of ultimate 
motivations and goals. Some researchers argue that all behaviour is ultimately self-
interested, that pro-social behaviour is really enlightened self-interest, a position that is 
known as psychological egoism (Feinberg, 1978). This position has seemed attractive to 
some because the reasons I act for are my reasons and the goals I pursue are my goals. 
However, nothing follows from this: There can be a separation between my goals and 
my welfare; it is not true that pursuing my goals and my reasons will always make me 
better off. (Butler argued that it is not in one’s self-interest to be self-regarding long ago 
in his Sermons; for a more recent argument against psychological egoism see Sober and 
Wilson, 1998.) 
 We can understand this distinction—between goals that are motivated by 
enlightened self-interest, where helping others positively impacts the agent’s own 
welfare, and goals that do not promote the agent’s welfare—in the context of Sen’s 
(1977) distinction between sympathy and commitment. Sympathy is when the concern 
for others directly affects the agent’s own welfare, an idea that Sen takes from Smith 
and Edgeworth, although arguably it is closer to our modern notion of empathy: the 
agent takes pleasure in others’ gains and pain in others’ losses. Commitment is when 
the outcome that the agent is concerned about does not directly impact on his or her 
welfare, but the agent is never-the-less motivated to achieve it. Commitment covers a 
class of reasons for acting that result from normative imperatives including, but not 
limited to, moral imperatives. People’s actions can be over-determined. An agent who is 
committed to making a charitable donation might also take pleasure in it, even though 
that wasn’t her reason for contributing. Therefore, deciding whether or not an agent 
acts from commitment may require making judgments about counter-factual cases. An 
agent who acts with commitment is one who would have made the donation even if it 
had not made her better off by giving her pleasure. 
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 In the same way that some researchers argue that all behaviour is ultimately self-
interested, some philosophers might argue that all behaviour ought ultimately to be 
underpinned by morality. For instance, for a Utilitarian, the ultimate goal is the 
maximization of utility. For a Kantian, one should always ask whether one is acting on 
a principle that could be willed as a universal law.  
 But there are also other possible ultimate motivations. Batson (1994) identifies 
four ultimate motivations: 
(1) egoism—increasing the actor’s own welfare; the benefits can be material, social or 
self-rewards (e.g., monetary rewards, praise, self-esteem) or the avoidance of material, 
social or self-punishment (e.g. fines, social censure, guilt, shame) 
(2) collectivism— increasing the welfare of a group or collective 
(3) altruism—increasing the welfare of one or more individuals other than oneself 
(4) principlism—upholding some standard or principle; Batson specifies moral 
principles, but it is possible to act to uphold standards and principles that are not moral, 
e.g., professionalism involves working to a professional standard, or one might act to 
uphold the law and legal principles. 
 For Batson, these are all at least potentially ultimate motivations. He has spent 
his career studying pro-social behaviour and showing that altruism can be an ultimate 
motivation. His hypothesis is that we are motivated by empathy-induced altruism, that 
"feeling empathy for [a] person in need evokes motivation to help [that person] in 
which these benefits to self are not the ultimate goal of helping; they are unintended 
consequences” (Batson & Shaw, 1991, p.14). Thus, empathy-induced altruism is a form 
of commitment. Batson’s strategy is to take instances of helping behaviour and to show 
that they are not caused by plausible egoistic motives; that high empathisers continue to 
help even when the egoistic motivation is neutralized (Batson, 2011; Batson, 1992; 
Batson & Shaw, 1991). It is not a direct test of the hypothesis that altruism is caused by 
commitment but, by excluding a variety of egoistic explanations and showing that there 
is helping behaviour that they cannot account for, Batson increases the probability that 
altruistic behaviour is caused by commitment rather than being “a subtle and 
sophisticated form of egoism” (Batson, 2011, p.224). 
 Examples of all four types of motivation can be found in experimental and 
behavioural economics. Egoism is the standard currency of economists and behaviour 
in the lab varies a lot by individual, so any experiment that shows that at least some 
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subjects are pro-socially motivated also has some subjects who are egoists. Therefore I 
do not address it specifically. 
Altruism: The classic example of altruism in experimental economics is giving in 
dictator games. In a paradigm set-up, a subject is given $10 and can choose how much 
of it to give to another anonymous subject. Usually more than 60% of subjects give some 
money, with the mean transfer being approximately 20% of the total (Camerer, 2003). 
Collectivism: When group identity is manipulated, people are more favourable to ingroup 
members (Chen, Yan & Li, 2009). Some economists have argued that groups can be agents 
and individuals in groups use ‘team reasoning’, asking themselves the question “what 
should we do?”, and that this is the best way of explaining the vast empirical literature 
showing that people cooperate and coordinate in ways that standard individualist 
economic theory cannot explain (Sugden, 1993; Bacharach, 2006). 
Principlism: An example of principlism can be found in the literature on tax compliance. 
According to the principal of self-regard, tax evasion—like all other criminal behaviour—
should be viewed simply as a choice whether to take a gamble that has a positive payoff if 
successful but a penalty if caught (Becker, 1968). However, subjects in the lab do not act 
according to this model: subjects are less likely to take gambles if they are presented as a 
tax evasion decision (Baldry 1986; Baldry, 1987) and their behaviour is affected by moral 
constraints (Bosco, & Mittone, 1997). Of course, the lab is an artificial environment (and, 
one might argue, subjects could be influenced by “experimenter demand effects”) but self-
regard cannot explain actual tax evasion behaviour either, whilst the hypothesis that at 
least some tax payers are motivated by moral principles can (Gordon, 1989). 
 
 Although Batson (1994) does not mention social norms in his taxonomy, they 
have been prominent topics of research in behavioural economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Bicchieri 2005). However, this is not an important omission for Batson, given that 
he is concerned with ultimate motivation. Many researchers think that social norms are 
enforced by social approval and disapproval, or similar, in which case they are 
ultimately an egoist motivation, according to Batson’s typology. Alternatively, we can 
imagine someone who had completely internalized social norms (someone who, if she 
found herself alone on a desert island, would still follow conventions such as “walk on 
the right, stand on the left” or continue to keep up her manners, things that have 
conventionally been instilled in her as “the right thing to do”). This would seem to be a 
variety of principlism, albeit a slightly strange one. So while social norms are an 
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important form of proximate motivation, they can be subsumed within Batson’s 
categories of ultimate motivations. 
 A similar thing could be said about other types of non-self-regarding behaviour 
that experimental and behavioural economists have been interested in, such as equity, 
reciprocity, and trust and trustworthiness. Batson (1994) has a concise list because it is a 
list of ultimate motivations. In contrast, economists are better thought of as 
investigating proximate motivations and their models need not imply anything about 
ultimate motivations. The standard way of representing motivations in economics is as 
arguments in a utility function. Despite the terminology, the utility function only 
represents an agent’s goals; it is a functionalist method of predicting action. The same 
function could represent either a “warm glow” from sympathy or a non-sentimental 
commitment. Further, there is no presumption that agents know their own utility 
functions: utility theory describes how people act but does not presume that people are 
aware of their own motivations. 
 Economists now agree there is a multiplicity of types of proximate motivation, 
including many that are not self-interested, and arguably there are multiple types of 
ultimate motivations. Economists tend to study each motivation in a particular setting or 
laboratory game. In order to rationalise he number of explanations of behaviour, they have 
developed hybrid models, which include multiple motivations, that aim to explain 
behaviour in multiple types of experiments. But even these models cannot explain all the 
empirical evidence (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). The new Das Adam Smith problem, as I 
investigate it here, is a question about how these different motivations are related; it arises 
for proximate as well as ultimate motivations, so the question requires answering 
regardless of one’s view on ultimate motivations. 
 
3. The importance of the problem: The motivation crowding effect 
 It’s important to have a theory of motivation because different motivations respond 
to different incentives, and using monetary incentives when people are acting on non-self-
regarding motivations can be counter-productive. Well known examples of financial 
incentives backfiring include: payment for blood leading to less blood being collected 
(Mellström & Johannesson, 2008); fines for parents who failed to pick up their children on 
time from daycare leading to increased lateness, which persisted even after the fine was 
removed (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000); the offer of financial compensation increasing 
NIMBY-ism, when people were asked if they would permit a nuclear waste repository to 
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be sited in their community (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997); the use of financial penalties 
for untrustworthy behaviour increasing the amount of untrustworthy behaviour (Fehr & 
List, 2004); and the use of financial penalties to enforce contracts leading to more contracts 
being breached (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Why does this happen and what are the 
implications for institutional design? 
 The examples I just gave are all instances where payment affects pro-social 
behaviour. They are also often given by economists as examples of the motivation crowding 
effect, where payment for a task crowds out intrinsic motivation (e.g. Frey, 1997a; Bowles, 
2008; Bowles 2016). The concept of intrinsic motivation is slippery. An early definition in 
the literature is that “[o]ne is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when 
one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself.” (Deci, 1975, p.175). Conversely, 
one is extrinsically motivated when one does something to receive a reward or avoid a 
punishment. Let us call this Definition 1. (This is already slippery: what is an “apparent 
reward”? My reading is that it is a tangible, physical reward, i.e. it does not include 
intangible rewards like esteem.) Another way of thinking about the difference between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is that one is intrinsically motivated when one does 
something for its own sake. Let us call this Definition 2. So while Definition 1 characterizes 
motivation crowding according to the environment in which the behaviour occurs, 
Definition 2 characterizes it in terms of ultimate motivations, which has some different 
implications, as we will see below 
 The original and paradigm example of motivation crowding from psychology 
involved payment for effort. Subjects who had been paid to solve puzzles were less likely 
to return to them later, after payment had been withdrawn, than a control group who had 
received no reward for their activity in the first period; and the paid subjects also reported 
a lesser interest in the task than the unpaid (Deci, 1975, 1971). Amongst psychologists, the 
predominant explanation for motivation crowding is the over-justification of the agent, 
where the payment is seen as controlling, and the external intervention therefore 
undermines feelings of self-determination and autonomy, which causes the agent to 
relinquish the intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000). 
 In this early work, intrinsic motivation was defined in contrast to extrinsic 
motivation, as anything that is not done for a tangible reward (Definition 1). So it was 
natural to interpret intrinsic motivation as encompassing many different sorts of 
motivations for undertaking an activity, including both enjoyment of a task and pro-social 
motivations. As we saw in the examples at the beginning of this section, payments can 
crowd out pro-social motivations as well as effort. However, in later work, Ryan and Deci 
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(2000) provide a rather more refined definition of intrinsic motivation. They say that it is 
“the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable 
consequence. When intrinsically motivated, a person is moved to act for the fun or 
challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards.” (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000, p.56). They take Definition 2 and extend it, by specifying the exact motivation: 
for fun or challenge. Therefore, according to Ryan & Deci’s definition, pro-social 
motivation is not an intrinsic motivation, since it is based on benefitting others rather than 
on interest in and enjoyment of a task (see also Grant, 2008). 
 Even if we discard the stipulation that intrinsic motivation involves acting for fun 
or challenge, retaining only the idea that it involves doing something for its own sake (i.e. 
adopt Definition 2), psychologists have noted differences between pro-social motivations 
and the motivation to make an effort, which imply that the over-justification theory does 
not apply to pro-social motivations. Grant (2008) starts from the position that intrinsic 
motivation is associated with pleasure and enjoyment, and pro-social motivation with 
meaning and purpose.1 He argues that: intrinsic motivation phenomenologically pulls 
people to do things, whereas pro-social motivation may require people to push 
themselves, necessitating self-regulation to achieve a goal; intrinsic motivation focusses on 
the process, whereas pro-social motivation focuses on the outcome or goal;2 and that—
relatedly—intrinsic motivation involves a focus on the present experience, whereas pro-
social motivation involves a focus on the future, on the meaningful outcome that will 
result from the behaviour.3 
However, this implies that there is problem with using the over-justification theory 
to explain the effect of incentives on prosocial motivations. For Grant (2008, p.49), it 
follows from the differences between them that intrinsic and pro-social motivations 
involve different levels of autonomy. He says that intrinsic motivation is “fully volitional, 
                                               
1 In his paper, Grant refers to motivations as desires, so that intrinsic motivation is “the 
desire to expend effort based on interest in and enjoyment of the work itself” and pro-
social motivation is “the desire to expend effort to benefit other people” (p.49). I have not 
repeated this full definition because it is pretty clear to me that it is incorrect to define a 
motivation as a desire; at the very least this needs to be amended to the desire that is acted 
on, since we may have plenty of desires that are latent or not acted on. 
2 It is not clear that motivations like fairness fit so neatly into this dichotomy, since fairness 
can be about following correct processes (procedural) as well as about fair outcomes. 
3 We might note that it is not so clear whether this contention is true. Grant’s (2008) 
position is consistent with that of other researchers who have hypothesized that self-
control and cooperation (especially in prisoner’s dilemmas) both require the subjugation 
of short-term goals for long-term ones (Dewitte & Cremer, 2001). However, there is 
evidence that cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas is the spontanteous, intuitive response, 
which is reigned in by reflective decision-making (Rand & Nowak, 2013), which suggests 
that self-control doesn’t require self-regulation so much as not thinking. 
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self-determined and autonomous” whereas pro-social motivation “is less autonomous, as 
it is based more heavily on conscious self-regulation and self-control to achieve a goal”. If 
pro-social motivations are not associated with autonomy, then the explanation for the 
crowding out of pro-social motivations cannot be that autonomy is impaired.  
There are two possible counters, neither of which entirely solves the problem. First, 
one could get into a philosophical debate about what constitutes autonomy, arguing that 
self-regulation is a form of Kantian autonomy, where one follows a rule that one makes for 
oneself. (Grant, 2011, discussing a slightly different question around the ethics of 
incentives, takes this sort of line.) However, this response misses that Grant’s (2008) point 
is really about the phenomenology of behaviour: if the mechanism of motivation crowding 
is that applying incentives makes people lose their feeling of being autonomous, and if 
pro-social behaviour often does not feel autonomous in the first place, then there is no 
reason to expect pro-social behaviour to respond to the mechanism—even if it belongs to 
the pholosophical category of Kantian autonomy. Second, psychologists allow that, to the 
extent that we value and identify with pro-social behaviours, we may experience greater 
autonomy in their performance (Ryan and Deci, 2000). But they also make it quite clear 
that they consider pro-social motivation a type of extrinsic motivation because acting for 
the benefit of others, even if that fulfils core values and identities, is a type of external goal. 
(Though this would seem to conflate having an external goal and wanting to achieve that 
goal for its own sake, as an ultimate goal). 
One response would simply be to follow Bowles (2008) in endorsing a variety of 
mechanisms of motivation crowding, so different instances of crowding are explained by 
different mechanisms. But that leaves us in a place where we cannot conclude much. 
Bowles’ recommendations to policy makers are: to use more realistic psychological 
assumptions when doing mechanism design, and that good policies and constitutions will 
support socially valued ends by evoking, cultivating, and empowering public-spirited 
motives. These are all very sensible, but not very specific. It would be nice to be able to say 
something more specific about institutional design or the direction of research needed to 
do good design.  
Instead, I will propose a different mechanism, which can explain both the crowding 
out of intrinsic motivations and the crowding out of pro-social motivations, and explore 
the implications for policy and research. 
 
4. Framing and motivation crowding 
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 One solution to the original Das Adam Smith Problem is that different motivations 
are used in different spheres, and with different people (Nieli, 1986; Roberts 2014). That 
has an intuitive plausibility about it. I want to think about this in the context of research on 
the prisoner’s dilemma, which is extensive, and suggests a more specific mechanism.  
 It should not come as a surprise to anyone that there is a higher rate of cooperation 
in the prisoner’s dilemma when it is called the “Community Game” rather than the “Wall 
Street Game” (Ross & Ward,1997). Changing the labels on a decision-problem and 
observing that this causes people to choose differently is an example of a framing effect. 
Framing is often implicitly and sometimes explicitly offered as an explanation of the effect 
of payments on effort (e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Heyman & Ariely, 2004). 
Lindenberg and Frey (1993) claim that when motivation crowding occurs a “gain frame” 
crowds out a “normative frame”, but this is not explained in any further detail.  
 We can think of the agent’s frame as the set of concepts that she uses to think about 
her situation (Bacharach, 2003). Framing is notorious because of Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1981) work on framing effects, where two groups of subjects were put in the position of 
policy makers facing an epidemic and asked to choose between two vaccination programs. 
Subjects who were given the decision problem in terms of “lives saved” by each program 
tended to choose a different program to those who were given the problem in terms of 
“lives lost” by each program. Similarly, Ross & Ward (1975) took a laboratory prisoner’s 
dilemma but for one set of subjects they referred to it as the “Community Game” and for 
another they referred to it as the “Wall Street Game”. Two-thirds of subjects cooperated in 
the Community Game, compared to one-third in the Wall Street Game.  
There is another framing effect involving prisoner’s dilemmas that researchers have 
hypothesized is caused by a change in motivations. The standard way of presenting 
prisoner’s dilemma is as a 2x2 payoff matrix. However, it is possible to “decompose” the 
payoffs and present them as a choice between two different allocations of payoffs between 
Player 1 and Player 2 (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Pruitt, 1967). Figure 1 gives an 
example of a prisoner’s dilemma matrix and an associated decomposed game. Both 
players choose a payoff allocation and then each gets the total of the payoff they awarded 
to themself plus the payoff s/he was awarded by the other player. For instance, if Player 1 
chooses allocation C and Player 2 chooses allocation D then Player 1 has assigned 0 to 
herself and 12 to Player 2 whilst Player 2 has assigned 6 to herself and 0 to Player 1. So 
Player 1 gets 0 from herself and 0 from Player 2, a total of 0. Player 2 gets 12 from his 
choice and 6 from player one, a total of 18. The outcome is 0 for Player 1 and 18 for Player 
2, which is the same as the payoffs for (C, D) in the game matrix. The totals from each 
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combination of allocations is the same as the payoff from the equivalent strategy 
combination in the prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, in any decomposed game, it is possible 
to work out the payoff matrix from the choices in the allocation decision.4 The 
decomposition and the parent game are two different ways of presenting the four possible 
payoff outcomes. However, experimenters have found higher rates of cooperation with 
the decomposed game compared to the matrix presentation (Pruitt, 1967; Komorita, 1987; 
Cookson, 2000).  
In an investigation designed to discover why behavior was different in the 
decomposed games, Pruitt asked subjects to record the thinking behind their decisions 
(Pruitt, 1970). He discovered that, in accordance with expectations derived from game 
theoretic reasoning, those who played D in the above games were motivated by the payoff 
they could get by doing so. In the decomposed game, responses to open-ended questions 
showed that many subjects viewed alternative C as a way of being “helpful” or 
“generous”. Pruitt (1970, p.235) postulated that “the games produce differing motives, 
which in turn produce differing behavior”, a suggestion that has also been echoed by 
Colman (1995).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained their framing effect using Prospect 
Theory, drawing on the idea that people display different risk preferences depending on 
whether options are framed as losses or gains. However, it is hard to see how Prospect 
Theory could explain the difference in play between these differently framed prisoner’s 
dilemmas—or, for that matter, the examples of collectivism and principlism in Section 2, 
which were also demonstrated by taking a laboratory game and changing the framing: 
manipulating the group identity of the players (collectivism) or calling a gamble a tax 
evasion decision (principlism). To explain these examples, we need a more general theory 
of framing effects. 
Decision theorists have given explanations of framing effects that relate them to 
reasons (Dietrich & List, 2016; Weirich, 2010; Gold & List, 2004; Schick, 2003). What the 
different models have in common is that the reasons that underpin an agent’s choices 
depend on how they frame or, in the case of Schick (2003), “understand” the decision. 
Note that acting and choosing for a reason does not have to be understood as involving a 
conscious reasoning process. A minimal requirement is that the agent is disposed to be 
responsive to reasons, where these are based on facts that count in favor of a particular 
                                               
4 However, we cannot assume that a player would see any given decomposition from the parent 
game because, if a prisoner’s dilemma is decomposable, then there are an infinite number of 
possible decompositions (Messick & McClintock, 1968). 
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decision or action. In this paradigm, framing effects occur when there are reasons in favor 
of both options and the reason that the agent responds to depends on the way in which the 
decision is presented or described. In effect, these agents are not weighing all their 
reasons, but act on the basis of a single reason. If they have an acceptable reason to hand, 
then they do not search for others. This has psychological plausibility. It is consistent with 
evidence of “concrete thinking”, whereby decision-makers appear to use only surface 
information and information that has to be inferred from the display or created by some 
mental transformation tends to be ignored (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1988; 
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978). Concrete thinking may be connected to people’s 
desire to justify decisions by saying that they chose for a (single) reason, even to the extent 
of constructing and selecting choice situations such that there is always a dominant reason 
for choice (Montgomery, 1983). Once a reason for choice has presented itself, people are 
not motivated to seek out further reasons. Call this “one-reason decision-making”. 
In Tversky and Kahneman’s problem, the fact some people will die for sure is a 
reason not to choose the policy with certain outcomes, while the fact that there is a 
possible outcome where no-one is saved is a reason not to choose the risky policy. The two 
different ways of framing the decision make these different reasons salient, which affects 
people’s choices (Gold & List, 2004). This explanation is in accordance with the 
psychological literature on “reason-based choice”. A classic example there is the custody 
decision, where the question of which parent should get custody elicits the same answer as 
the question of which parent should not get custody: the questions elicit a search for 
positive and negative attributes respectively, which would be reasons for giving or not 
giving custody, and one parent has both more positive and more negative attributes 
(Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993).5  
The idea that the presentation of the decision affects the reason that people act on 
can explain a wide class of framing effects, including ones that involve motivations. 
Reasons are connected to motivations. We can think of the reason for which an agent acts 
as her motivating reason, so framing can affect an agent’s motivating reason. 
In the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma, game-theoretic reasoning about monetary 
payoffs conflicts with being helpful or generous. This is sometimes referred to as “might 
versus morality” (Liebrand et al, 1986). According to Pruitt (1970) and Colman (1995), the 
decomposition makes helpfulness, or the moral side of the coin, more salient. Their 
                                               
5 It is possible to translate between the “value-based” model given by Tversky and Kahneman and 
the “reason-based” tradition. Roughly, what Kahneman and Tversky describe as a change in 
curvature of the utility function becomes a difference in how people value the options. See also 
Gold & List (2004). 
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suggestion is supported by evidence that the way that subjects frame the prisoner’s 
dilemma correlates with the move they make. Subjects who perceive playing C as co-
operative and playing D as non-co-operative are more likely to play C (Baranowski, & 
Summers, 1972). Similarly, co-operative types (defined as such because they behave co-
operatively) tend to frame the dilemma in terms of morality (Liebrand et al, 1986). If moral 
reasons support a different choice from game-theoretic dominance reasoning and the 
salience of these reasons can be affected by the presentation of the decision, then people 
will make different choices in different frames. Further, Bruner (1957) postulates that once 
an agent has categorized a situation, incongruent cues may be “gated out”. Bruner does 
not say how or why gating out occurs but, in cognitive psychology, there is a well-known 
effect called assimilation, where an agent perceives an object’s attributes as more typical of 
the category that is being used than it actually is (Herr, Sherman,& Fazio, 1983).  
The reason-based explanation of framing effects is consistent with the evidence of a 
connection between framing and behavior in prisoner’s dilemmas, but refines it by 
offering a direction of causality, namely that framing the game in moral terms may lead to 
co-operative behavior by increasing the perception of, and hence the chance that people 
act on, moral or other-regarding reasons. 
A framing theory of motivation crowding can also explain the paradigm examples 
of motivation crowding, where payment crowds out intrinsic motivations. These do not 
involve changes in explicit descriptions. However, the monetary payment may still affect 
the way subjects frame the situation. Take Deci’s (1975, 1971) experiments, where subjects 
were given puzzles to solve. There were two periods in this experiment. In the second 
period, subjects were left alone in the room with the puzzles. This was the same for all 
subjects. In the first period, half of the subjects were paid to solve puzzles and half of the 
subjects played with them without payment. Deci found that first period activity affected 
second period behavior, even though naïve theory suggested that the second period was 
the same for all subjects. The first period activity may have served as an implicit framing 
task. The puzzles were supposed to be interesting to solve for their own sake. Subjects 
who were paid were given another way to think about the puzzles: as an activity engaged 
in to make money. In the second period, the monetary payment was withdrawn. If the 
subjects who had been paid framed the task of solving them in terms of money, and acted 
on their monetary motivations, then their reason for solving the puzzles would have gone. 
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Concrete thinkers, who do not generally search for information, would not investigate 
whether there were other reasons to carry on solving the puzzles.6  
When an agent is performing a task that she has intrinsic reasons or other-
regarding reasons to do and she is also being paid, then her action is over-determined. 
There is a sense in which she is over-justified—because she has multiple reasons in favor 
of her action, not because the price is seen as an instrument of control. If people are one-
reason decision-makers, then one of the motivations will become the primary motivating 
reason, at the expense of any others. Why should the monetary rather than the non-
monetary reason become the motivating reason? 
We can answer this question by drawing on attribution theory, according to which 
actors are more likely to attribute their behavior to external factors than internal ones 
(Jones et al, 1972; Heider, 1958). So attribution theory would predict that, if agents are 
offered payment, then they will attribute their motivation to the payment, rather than any 
intrinsic or pro-social motivation they may also have had. This is also supported by 
evidence from the Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross, 1977). The Fundamental 
Attribution Error is an asymmetry in the way people explain behaviour, with people 
explaining their own behaviour differently from the way they explain the behaviour of 
others. The important thing for us is that people tend to attribute the causes of their own 
behaviour to their external situation (whereas they tend to attribute other people’s 
behaviour to internal traits). So if I send in my paper late, then I explain it by saying things 
such as “I had some important emergencies that prevented me from finishing on time” 
(whereas if your paper is late I am more likely to say that you are bad at time management 
or cannot stick to deadlines). So the Fundamental Attribution Error supports the idea that 
if we offer someone a reward for performing a behaviour, then she is likely to attribute her 
behaviour to the presence of the reward. In that case, it is not surprising that she would 
stop the behaviour when the reward is withdrawn.7 
The cases I have discussed so far have all been examples of both framing effects and 
motivation crowding. However, the framing mechanism can also explain examples where 
there is an actual change in the situation, as well as a change in framing, i.e. which are not 
                                               
6 In further support of the framing theory of motivation crowding for the paradigm effects, 
we know that the salience of the reward affects motivation crowding. Ross (1975) has 
shown that a highly salient reward is more detrimental to intrinsic interest than the same 
reward when it is relatively non-salient. He also showed that reward is less detrimental 
when the subject’s attention is distracted from it. 
7 Interestingly, the Fundamental Attribution Error might also explain why people do not 
predict motivation crowding effects in others, tending to choose to use incentives even 
when their effect is counterproductive (Fehr & List, 2004). 
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framing effects. So I am not claiming that all motivation crowding effects are framing 
effects and I do not mean to make any claim about the rationality of motivation crowding. 
But the process of framing, which operates in framing effects, also operates in cases of 
motivation crowding. Introducing a reward also introduces a new way to think about the 
behaviour, as being done for a reward. There is a change in the agent’s frame. Changing 
the way that people frame a problem may change their motivating reason. Once someone 
has the concept of doing something for a reward in their frame (or, as Lindenberg and 
Frey put it, uses a “gain frame”), then it becomes likely that withdrawal of payment leads 
to cessation of the activity. This mechanism explains the contention of Lindenberg and 
Frey (1993), that a “gain frame” will “crowd out” other ways of framing the task. 
 
5. Implications for research 
There has been a tendency for economists to resist adding frames as a primitive to their 
theories and a tendency to think of framing as irrational. Both of these tendencies are 
mistakes. 
 Frames are usually thought of as a purely cognitive feature. In the classic accounts 
of framing effects, frames may affect the attractiveness of options, quite literally. For 
instance, describing beef as 25% fat instead of 75% lean makes people rate it as less likely 
to be tasty (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). And the standard question that follows from framing 
effects is how can people be so irrational as to change what they want when all that has 
changed is the description? If the decision is whether to have a surgical procedure with a 
90% survival rate and a 10% mortality rate (McNeill et al, 1992), then there are serious 
consequences that follow from the choice. In my account of motivation crowding as 
involving framing, frames also have normative features. A change in frame is not just 
about changing the attractiveness of an option, but it also changes what motivations and 
behaviours are seen as appropriate. 
 Framing is a part of the decision-making process, prior to assessing options and 
making choices. Most motivation crowding effects are not framing effects, even if they do 
involve framing, so the rationality or otherwise of framing effects is orthogonal to this 
discussion. But we might note that these general effects on motivation cast doubt on at 
least some of the reasons for declaring framing effects irrational. The core assumption is 
that it is irrational for one’s choice to depend merely on the description. One reason that 
has been given for this is that the sort of selective seeing of a situation that is involved in 
framing is irrational; that rationality requires us to see all possible ways of framing a 
situation and that this requirement is imposed by orthodox decision theory (Skyrms, 
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1998). The classic examples of framing effects have two obvious frames, the opposition 
between positive and negative. However, once we move to a theory where frames can 
activate motivations, then there are an infinite number of ways of framing the situation. 
For instance, in the prisoner’s dilemma, if there is one way of decomposing a matrix then 
there are an infinite number of possible decompositions. We have finite minds so we 
cannot see them all. This casts some doubt on whether it really is irrational not to see all 
the decompositions, unless rationality is merely a standard to which we aspire rather than 
a state we have any hope of achieving. Separating discussion of framing from the 
presumption of irrationality is a good thing because the presumption of irrationality may 
be a barrier to economists incorporating framing in their models.  
 Another unsuccessful argument against adding frames to the primitives of rational 
choice theory is that we can do all of the work using expectations. Some of the examples I 
discussed above might involve a change in expectations. For instance, changing the 
framing in the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma by decomposing the game or by calling it 
the “Community Game” may change a player’s expectations about what the other player 
will do. In many theories this change in expectations will cause a change in behaviour. For 
example, in the Rabin (1993) model of reciprocal fairness, agents want to be kind to agents 
who they expect will be kind to them. If a player vcares about Rabin-kindness and the 
decomposed dilemma leads her to expect that her co-player will cooperate, then the 
change in expectations could lead her to cooperate. But why would decomposing the 
dilemma increase a player’s expectation that her co-player will be kind, without including 
an increased perception of the possibility of kindness in the explanation?  
To see more clearly why this must be the case, consider an alternative theory that 
gives a prominent role to expectations, the idea that people are acting on social norms, 
whereby they have a conditional preference that they conform given that others will too 
(Bicchieri, 2005). In order for a social norm to lead to cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma, 
a player needs to know that a social norm exists and have an expectation that other 
players will cooperate. So there are two routes by which a change in presentation could 
lead to a change in behaviour. Either it could directly cause a player to perceive that they 
are in a situation that is governed by a social norm, when s/he did not see that before, or it 
could change expectations about the other player’s behaviour. If a player’s own frame has 
not changed but the change in presentation has changed her expectations about others, 
then the player’s beliefs about whether the other player has perceived the norm must have 
changed. So either her frame or her beliefs about the other player’s frame have changed; 
either way, we cannot dispense with the notion of a frame. The same applies to the case of 
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Rabin-kindness; just replace “norm” with “Rabin-kindness” in the argument. In both 
cases, the change in expectations of behaviour occurs because there is a change in 
expectation about how the other player frames the decision.  
 There is also evidence that framing can affect honest behavior without changing 
expectations. Cohn, Fehr, & Maréchal (2014) ran an honesty experiment, where subjects’ 
payments depended on the outcome of a coin toss, which they self-reported, giving them 
the incentive to report dishonestly. (In this type of experiment, the subjects’ actions are 
anonymous—with a large number of participants we would expect the distribution of 
heads and tails to follow a binomial distribution, for instance with a single coin toss we 
would expect heads and tails each to come up 50% of the time, so if the distribution of the 
subjects’ reports is skewed away from that, it is a sign of dishonest reporting, and one can 
compare dishonesty between experimental conditions by comparing the distribution of 
the number of heads reported.) The subjects were bank employees and the researchers 
found that making subjects’ professional identities as bank employees salient increased 
dishonest reporting. However, they also measured subjects’ beliefs about other bank 
employees’ reporting behaviour and this was not affected by the framing. The change in 
behaviour seems to have been caused by the framing, not by the expectations of what 
others would do. 
 When discussing situations with normative features, there has been a tendency for 
behavioural economists to focus on expectations, even when those expectations are 
connected to contexts. For instance, in Bicchieri’s (2005) theory of social norms, a norm is 
triggered by the context, but the existence of a norm is defined as a network of 
expectations and the tests of the theory involve fixing a context and testing the effect of 
changing expectations. Similarly, List (2007, p.84), when discussing his finding that the 
amount sent in dictator games is sensitive to whether the experiment also includes the 
option to take money, concludes that the traditional set-up ‘evokes expectations of the 
“givers” and “receivers” that seemingly demand a positive gift.’ He concludes that the 
different choice sets invoke different social norms. One research implication that follows 
from the importance of framing is that we should be investigating what frames people 
bring to the situations we are studying, how that connects to their motivations, and using 
that knowledge to formulate testable hypotheses about what motivates their behaviour 
and what will induce behaviour change.8 We need to focus on frames, not just on 
expectations. 
                                               
8 Lakoff (2014) has already been doing this sort of thing, not in the context of incentives, 
but in the context of political persuasion. 
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 Some of what we find might surprise us. For instance, the market frame is 
associated with the efficacy of financial incentives and the pursuit of self-interest, but it is 
also associated with fairness and trust. Societies with market structures are more likely to 
be cooperative (Henrich et al., 2001); priming markets leads to senders sending more 
money in a trust game, but not in a dictator game (Al-Ubaydli, 2013). Markets are not only 
about the pursuit of narrowly defined self-regard, they are constrained by rules.  
Exchanges are not simultaneous, someone usually has to be the first mover, but when you 
hand your money to the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, you are confident that they will 
hand over the goods (Gold, 2014). Many people do not count their change. They can feel 
safe doing that because, in markets, bargaining is permitted but cheating is not. 
 We need framing even if we think both market and non-market behaviour are 
encompassed in a single overarching theory of behaviour. One solution that has been 
offered to Das Adam Smith Problem is that, although there seem to be two spheres, the 
principles of action are actually the same in each (Otteson, 2002; Smith, 1998). For instance, 
Smith (1998) argues that we maximise the gains from exchange in both markets and 
personal exchange, but in markets this is done through non-cooperative self-interest and 
in personal exchange through reciprocity. However, even in this theory, people need some 
way of identifying when market exchange is appropriate and when they should be 
engaging in personal exchange. People create and maintain strong distinctions among 
different kinds of social relations and meaning systems, to convey whether exchanges are 
gifts, entitlements, or payments (Zelizer, 1997). If there is a mismatch between the two 
sides of an exchange, between people who are pro-socially motivated and people who are 
not, then there is the opportunity for exploitation (Andersen, 1990). 
 The picture of decision-making proposed here recommends a different role for 
framing in institutional design than that suggested by the way framing if perceived in the 
“heuristics and biases” programme. Instead of setting up framing in order to enable 
people to be rational, we should design institutions that support framings that produce 
good outcomes. Sometimes that will involve a market frame and financial incentives, but 
other times it will involve supporting non-market ways of seeing the interaction and pro-
social motivations. Institutional designers need to ensure that incentives offered are 
congruent with motivations, if they are to achieve their required results. And when 
making institutional changes, the impact on frames should be considered. It may be the 
case that treating people as though they are extrinsically motivated will actually cause 
them to be so motivated, creating the need for incentives and rewards where none existed 
before. (Further discussion of the idea that designing institutions as if people are knaves 
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causes them to behave as such can be found in Frey, 1997b). Or, when we desire to change 




There was something lost at the origins of political economy that we are rediscovering: 
the importance of pro-social motivations, and how they interact with and can be a 
corrective to self-regard. I have argued that we should understand motivations as being 
prompted by different normative frames. This leads to a new research direction, 
investigating a broader range of frames, and a policy recommendation, to design 
institutions to support frames that we consider desirable and efficacious. The currency 
of reward needs to be appropriate to the motivation, and feedback from rewards to 
frames should be considered. But we need to do this in ways that do not promote the 
exploitation of those who are pro-social, either because they are not adequately 
financially rewarded or because they are exploited by a self-regarding partner in the 
interaction. 
 One question I have not addressed is why we should design institutions to 
support pro-sociality, rather than letting market incentives take their course. One 
answer is that sometimes pro-social outcomes are more effective. Another might speak 
of the type of society we want to live in. A third brings me back to Adam Smith. In this 
paper, I have spoken quite narrowly of self-regard. But people’s enlightened self-
interest includes behaving pro-socially.  Helping others is welfare increasing (Grant, 
2013). The idea that social well-being is a part of our self-interest would have been 
familiar to Smith and is another return to the origins of political economy (Schmidtz, 
2016; Paganelli, 2016). 
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Figure 1. Alternative presentations of the prisoner’s dilemma.  
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